A New International Division of Labor in Europe: Offshoring and Outsourcing to Eastern Europe by Marin, Dalia
Dalia Marin:
A New International Division of Labor in Europe:
Offshoring and Outsourcing to Eastern Europe
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2005-17
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/714/
 
 
A New International Division of Labor in Europe: 
Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dalia Marin 
University of  Munich 
 
 
September 2005 
 
                                 
Abstract 
  
 
Europe is reorganizing its international value chain. I document these changes in Europe’s interna-
tional organization of production with new survey data of Austrian and German firms investing in 
Eastern Europe. I show estimates of the share of intra-firm trade between Austria and Germany on the 
one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. Furthermore, I present empirical evidence of the drivers of 
the new division of labor in Europe. I find among other things that falling trade costs and falling cor-
ruption levels as well as improvements in the contracting environment  in Eastern Europe are affecting 
the level of intra-firm imports from Eastern Europe. They are also favoring outsourcing over offshor-
ing. Low organizational costs of hierarchies and large costs of hold-up (when there are no alternative 
investors in Old Europe or no alternative suppliers in Eastern Europe) are favoring offshoring over 
outsourcing. Tax holidays granted by host countries in Eastern Europe also mildly affect the organiza-
tional choice.    
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last decade a new division of labor has emerged in the world economy. The international divi-
sion of labor is characterized by firms geographically separating different production stages across the 
world economy to exploit differences in production costs. Thus, firms organize their activity in a 
global value chain. With Eastern Enlargement Europe is reorganising its international value chain. 
European firms outsource and offshore production to Eastern Europe.  As a result,  Eastern Europe is  
becoming an important location for European  firms' international  organisation of production. This 
paper raises three issues. First, why do firms organize in an international value chain? Second, what is 
the extent of outsourcing and offshoring to the new  member states (New Europe), to the countries of 
the next enlargement round (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia) and  to the Former Soviet Union including  
Russia and Ukraine?   Third, what determines empirically the level of offshoring and the organiza-
tional choice between offshoring and outsourcing  Eastern Europe? To address these questions the 
paper makes use of new firm survey data of 660 German and Austrian firms with 2200 investment 
projects in Eastern Europe during the period 1990 to 2001. The new survey data represent 100 percent 
of Austrian and 80 percent of German direct investment in Eastern Europe.1 
  
 
1. Outsourcing versus Offshoring 
 
Why do firms organize in an international value chain? The firm decides over two things. First, how 
much control does she want to have over the firm activity. Should the firm produce inside or outside 
of the firm boundaries. Second, where should she locate production, at home or abroad. These two 
decisions lead to the phenomenon of ‘international outsourcing’ or ‘offshoring’. International out-
sourcing is a relocation of activity outside the firm to an independent input supplier in New Europe. 
Offshoring is a relocation of activity to New Europe which remains inside the firm. 
                                                                          
The benefit of organizing an activity inside the firm is that the headquarter has more control over the 
activity and a stronger incentive to provide headquarter services. The costs of hierarchies, however, 
are the loss of the initiative of middle management. The benefit of organizing an activity outside the 
firm by outsourcing to an independent input supplier is that it promotes the incentives and the initia-
tive of the input supplier. However, it involves the cost of hold-up due to incomplete contracting. The 
                                                          
1 For more details on the data see Marin (2004). 
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firm chooses to offshore when the net gain from organizing the activity inside the firm outweighs the 
costs, i.e. when headquarter services are more important than the incentives of the input supplier on 
the one hand and when the loss of the initiative of management workers is less severe than the hold-up 
problem on the other. The firm chooses to outsource when the reverse is the case. Furthermore, the 
firm chooses the location with lowest production costs (including wages, transport costs, and the cost 
of contracting). Hence, a European firm will relocate activity inside or outside of firm boundaries to 
New Europe when unit labor costs there are lower compared to Old Europe.2 The question is how 
much can a European firm save in terms of labor unit costs when it decides to offshore or outsource to 
Eastern Europe?  
 
In Figure 1 I compare relative wages, relative productivity, and relative unit labor costs under out-
sourcing and offshoring, respectively between Austrian and German firms on the one hand and New 
Europe (CEE), the candidate countries of the second round (SEE), and the countries of the former 
Soviet Union (CIS), respectively on the other. I focus first on Germany. It appears from the left panel 
of Figure 1 that under outsourcing wages in New Europe are about 23 percent of those in Germany, 
while these countries’ productivity level has reached about 23 percent of Germany’s productivity 
level. As a result, under outsourcing labor unit costs in New Europe are the same as in Germany. 
These costs can, however, be substantially reduced when German firms offshore rather than outsource 
and produce the input in a German affiliate in New Europe. Figure 1 reveals that German affiliates in 
New Europe pay 17 percent of German parent wages but are increasing their productivity to 60 per-
cent of the parents’ firm productivity level.  Hence,  under offshoring they can reduce the labor unit 
costs by 72 percent relative to their parent firms’ cost in Germany.  
 
Under outsourcing to the SEE countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) both wages and productivity are 
low so that unit labor costs are 91 percent of Germany’s unit labor costs. Under offshoring, German 
firms can reduce labor unit costs to 84.2 percent of their parent German firms’ costs only, since pro-
ducing locally in SEE does not help to increase productivity as much as in New Europe. In the CIS 
(Russia, Ukraine) offshoring helps to reduce labor unit costs much more compared to outsourcing (to 
35 percent versus 67 percent of the German level) due to the low wages paid by German affiliates in 
this region.   Hence, German offshoring to New Europe and to the CIS is particularly attractive due to 
the high productivity level of German affiliates in New Europe and due to the low wages of German 
affiliates in the CIS.     The right panel of Figure 1 gives the data for Austrian firms with a similar 
pattern of relative costs as among German firms. 
                                                          
2 For the different global sourcing strategies see Antras (2003), and Antras and Helpman (2004), for the costs of 
hierarchies in the world economy see Marin and Verdier (2003, 2005), for the extent of the division of labor, see 
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1) outsourcing: average wage (wage bill per employee) in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
   offshoring: average wage (wage bill per employee) of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germnay and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000, 
   and for Germany in 1997-2000
2) outsourcing: GDP per employment in Eastern Europe relative to Germnay and Austria, respectively, in 2001
   offshoring: sales per employee of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000, and for Germany 
   in 1997-2000
3) outsourcing: wage bill divided by GDP in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
   offshoring: wage bill divided by sales of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austrisa, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000; for Germany
   in 1997-2000
Figure 1. Comparative Advantage of Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe
Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw); Statistisches Bundesamt; Statistik Austria; Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 
investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
CAND1 CAND2 CIS
23.4
10.4
5.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
23.5
11.4
8.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
99.7
91.0
67.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
24.4
10.8
5.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
23.0
11.2 7.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
106.2
97.0
71.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
CEE SEE CIS
relative wage1) 
Germany Austria 
16.5 18.6
3.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
27.6
49.4
27.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
60.0
37.7
11.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
15.7
11.8 10.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
32.3
20.5
16.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
48.7
57.5
62.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CEE SEE CIS
relative unit labor costs3) 
relative productivity2) 
relative unit labor costs3) 
relative productivity2) 
relative wage1) 
Outsourcing Outsourcing Offshoring Offshoring 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Acemoglu, Antras, Helpman (2005).  
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3.  Eastern Europe – A New Member in the International Division of Labor? 
 
We have just seen that by saving labor costs, it pays for a firm to relocate activity to Eastern Europe, 
particularly in the form of offshoring. But, how important is outsourcing and offshoring to Eastern 
Europe? One way to answer this question is to look at the pattern of intra-firm trade with Eastern 
Europe. In Table 1 I define an offshoring investment when a parent firm in Germany or Austria is 
exporting input goods to its affiliate in Eastern Europe as well as is importing these goods back from 
its affiliate in Eastern Europe after refinement. Thus, offshoring investments involve an intra-firm 
export from the parent firm in Germany or Austria to its affiliate in Eastern Europe as well as an intra-
firm import from the affiliate in Eastern Europe to Germany or Austria. 3 
 
Firms in percent2)
Baltic States 3.11 28.43
Czech Republic 11.73 75.95
Hungary 10.19 27.18
Poland 41.54 14.50
Slovak Republic 9.94 68.71
Slovenia 15.49 12.44
Bulgaria 2.99 71.94
Romania 24.20 63.68
other SEE 8.46 14.29
Russia 67.90 26.59
Ukraine 16.14 17.11
other CIS 3.72 49.36
   Austrian   German 
Table 1. Offshoring to Eastern Europe1)
CEE 17.12
SEE 12.06
42.11
46.68
55.68
2) of all foreign direct investments in respective Eastern European country.
1) parent firms export intermediate goods as well as import intermediate or final goods from their affiliates in Eastern Europe; A tighter criterion for outsourcing requiring that 
parent firms import at least 20 percent of their Eastern European affiliates' output (rather than import at all) reduces the German multinationals' outsourcing numbers for the Czech 
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
29.15
Total Eastern Europe 17.27 45.44
CIS
 
 
 
I focus first on Germany. From Table 1 we see that on average 45 percent of  German investment to 
Eastern Europe fulfill these criteria and are offshoring activities of German firms.  The importance of 
offshoring investment becomes, however, much larger for individual Eastern European countries. Off-
shoring dominates among German investment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Roma-
 6
nia (a share of around 70 percent). It plays little role in Slovenia and Poland. Offshoring to Eastern 
Europe is much less important among Austrian firms. Only 17 percent of Austrian investment to East-
ern Europe are offshoring investments. There is again considerable variation across individual coun-
tries with 68 percent of offshoring investment in Russia and 42 percent in Poland. 4  
 
Finally, the data allow me to calculate for the first time the share of intra-firm trade - international 
trade that takes place inside the multinational corporation between parent firms in Germany and Aus-
tria, respectively and their affiliates in Eastern Europe. This is given in Table 2. It turns out, that intra-
firm trade with Eastern Europe is a dominant phenomenon in Austria (68.5 percent of Austria’s im-
ports from Eastern Europe are goods from Austrian affiliates in Eastern Europe to their parent firms in 
Austria and 22.4 percent of Austria’s exports to Eastern Europe is trade within the multinational enter-
prise), while it is not very important for Germany’s trade with Eastern Europe (only 21.6 percent of 
imports and 11.7 percent of exports to EE are intra-firm trade). However, there is considerably varia-
tion across individual countries with a share of 65 percent of Germany’s imports from Slovakia and a 
share of 34 percent of its export to Slovakia as intra-firm trade.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 For different measures of offshoring and outsourcing see Hummels et al (2001) and  Hanson et al (2001).  
4 The reason for this difference between Germany and Austria is that in Germany 56.5 percent of offshoring 
investments to Eastern Europe are in the manufacturing sector, while in Austria they are mainly in services (71.7 
percent), in particular in banking and financial services.   
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share of intra-firm 
exports in total 
exports to Eastern 
Europe 3)
share of intra-firm 
imports in total imports 
from Eastern Europe 4)
share of intra-firm 
exports in total 
exports to Eastern 
Europe 3)
share of intra-firm 
imports in total 
imports from Eastern 
Europe 4)
CEE
   Baltic states 13.95 n.a. 5.19 14.41
   Czech Republic 19.67 42.17 6.83 15.64
   Hungary 20.03 136,47 5) 11.95 40.46
   Poland 41.08 64.91 17.77 15.34
   Slovak Republic 26.11 54.71 34.01 64.98
   Slovenia 18.70 48.36 3.32 9.38
SEE
   Bulgaria 3.36 11.32 2.30 4.20
   Croatia 16.08 40.40 1.78 1.95
   Romania 22.72 57.46 3.86 7.17
CIS
   Russia 34.57 26.70 4.94 1.67
   Ukraine 12.00 21.52 4.51 2.44
total 22.40 68.52 11.67 21.56
5) Austria's share of of intra-firm imports in total imports from Hungary exceeds 100% due to one particular large investment for which we could not disentangle goods 
delivered to the parent firm in Austria from those goods delivered to the parent firm in Singapore.
1) For Austria total trade with Eastern Europe is the average of 1999-2000, since the numbers of intrafirm exports and imports from the firm survey are from these years. 
The survey information on intrafirm exports and imports varied greatly for individual countries in Eastern Europe due to missing cases. In order to make the intrafirm 
trade numbers comparable with total trade with Eastern Europe, we artificially reduced total exports and imports by the number of missing cases of intra-firm exports 
and imports for individual Eastern European countries. Exports and imports from Eastern Europe, respectively, are reduced by a factor of (0.17, 0.10) for the Czech 
Republic, by (0.51, 0.39) for Hungary, by (0.26, 0.24) for Poland, by (0.58, 0.30) for the Slovak Republic, by (0.55, 0.20) for Slovenia, by (0.48, 0.47) for Bulgaria, by 
(0.38, 0.11) for Croatia, by (0.62, 0.47) for Romania, and by (0.74, 0.62) for Russia. For the Baltic States and for Ukraine total trade is not reduced because of no 
missing cases.
4)  intermediate or final goods delivered by Eastern European affiliates to parent firms for marketing or further reprocessing
3) intermediate inputs delivered by parent firms to Eastern European affiliates
2) For Germany total trade with Eastern Europe is the average of 1996-2000, since the numbers of intrafirm exports and imports from the firm survey are from these 
years. The survey information on intrafirm exports and imports varied greatly for individual countries in Eastern Europe due to missing cases. In order to make the 
intrafirm trade numbers comparable with total trade with Eastern Europe, we artificially reduced total exports and imports by the number of missing cases of intra-firm 
exports and imports for individual Eastern European countries. Exports and imports from Eastern Europe, respectively, are reduced by a factor of (0.63, 0.50) for the 
Baltic States, by (0.13, 0.00) for the Czech Republic, by (0.60, 0.40) for Hungary, by (0.87, 0.52) for Poland, by (0.10, 0.00) for the Slovak Republic, by (0.57, 0.35) 
for Romania, by (0.64, 0.34) for Russia, and by (0.75, 0.00) for Ukraine. For Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Croatia total trade is not reduced because of no missing cases.
Source: Chair of International Economics, University of Munich, firm survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms, Statistik Austria, Statistisches 
Bundesamt
Table 2.    Intra-Firm Trade in Total Trade with Eastern Europe  
Austria 1) Germany 2)
in percent
  
 
 
In sum, the pattern of intra-firm trade that has emerged between Germany and Eastern Europe on the 
one hand and Austria and Eastern Europe on the other, suggests that some of the Eastern European 
countries like Hungary, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia have 
clearly become new members in the international division of labor.5 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 For the impact of the new international division of labor on the skill premia in Germany, Austria and Poland, 
respectively, see Marin and Raubold (2005), Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2005), for its impact on unemploy-
ment in Austria and Germany, see Marin (2004). For the pattern of skill offshoring to Eastern Europe see Marin 
(2004), Marin, Lorentowicz, Raubold (2003).  
 8
 
4. Determinants of Offshoring and Outsourcing 
 
 
What forces are driving the new international division of labor which is emerging in Europe? In sec-
tion 2 I briefly summarized the factors determining the choice of organization. The firm will allocate 
power to the headquarter (offshoring) when the headquarter’s supply of services is more important 
than the input supplier’s incentives to deliver a specialized input for a certain price, since the party 
with control captures a larger fraction of the surplus and thus will have higher powered incentives to 
supply its services. Furthermore, the firm will allocate power to the headquarter when the organiza-
tional costs of hierarchies are less severe than the cost of hold-up. The fall of communism and the 
prospect of Eastern Enlargement resulted in a fall in trade costs and in the level of corruption as well 
as in an improvement in the contracting environment in the new member states increasing the attrac-
tion of this region as a location for European firms’ activities.6  
 
To determine the choice of organization in Eastern Europe I am running two types of regressions. 
First, I am estimating the determinants of the share of intra-firm imports from the affiliate in Eastern 
Europe in percent of parent firms’ sales in Austria and Germany, respectively (the level of offshoring) 
given in Table 3. Second, I am showing probit estimates of the choice between outsourcing and off-
shoring by German firms given in Table 4. As a proxy for the importance of headquarter services I use 
the variable R&D in percent of sales of parent firms. The dummy variable Aalternative captures the 
hold-up problem faced by German or Austrian investors. The hold-up problem is severe when there 
are no alternative suppliers in Eastern Europe for the German investor. Property rights is an alterna-
tive measure for the hold-up problem and captures the effectiveness of contract enforcement in Eastern 
Europe. Workers’ initiative   is a proxy for the organizational costs of hierarchies. The more decentral 
the decision making in the firm, the larger are the costs of organizing an activity inside the firm. This 
will be so, because firms choose a less hierarchical organization to avoid the costs of losing the initia-
tive of their skilled workers.7  
 
Turning to the right panel of Table 3, I find that in Germany intra-firm imports from Eastern Europe 
are the larger the more labor intensive (the smaller the capital to labor ratio K/L) and the more R&D 
intensive the German parent firm, the lower are the organizational costs of hierarchies (the more cen-
tral the parent firm’s decision making), the lower are transport costs (as measured by distance), the 
                                                          
6 Marin and Schnitzer (1995, 2002) and Nunn (2005) show that incentive problems and the contracting environ-
ment affects the pattern of trade as well.  
 9
lower is the ratio of affiliate to parent wages, when contract enforcement is weak in the Eastern Euro-
pean  country, and finally when the German firm cannot choose between alternative input suppliers in 
the host country. These results suggest that German firms want to offshore to a low wage country (and 
thus intra firm imports are larger) when labor costs matter and transport costs are not too high. We 
know from Figure 1 that German firms can reduce labor costs most effectively by offshoring rather 
than by outsourcing. The risk of hold-up is larger in countries with weak contract enforcement which 
increases the costs of organizing the activity outside the firm.  The other measure of hold-up Aalterna-
tive appears, however, not to be significant at conventional levels, while the cost of hierarchies vari-
able workers’ initiative is highly significant. The other variables suggested by theory like the produc-
tivity dispersion among German firms and the ratio of affiliate to parent wages (see Antras/Helpman 
2004) appear not to be significant. 
 
The left panel of Table 3 shows the results for Austrian firms with some striking differences. Austrian 
firms do more offshoring when they are less rather than more R&D intensive and when they are capi-
tal intensive rather than labor intensive. This is so even when controlling for the fact that Austria’s 
investments to Eastern Europe are mainly in banking and financial service industries. Moreover, Aus-
trian parent firms import the more from their affiliates, the more R&D intensive are their affiliates in 
Eastern Europe.8 Hold-up (property rights, Aalternatives, not shown) and organizational costs (work-
ers’ initiative) are not significant, while tax holidays granted by the host country and the  productivity 
dispersion among firms in Austria both significantly affect the level of intra-firm imports. 
 
I turn now to the choice of organization between outsourcing and offshoring by German firms in Table 
4. By choosing between outsourcing and offshoring, the firm decides over the amount of control she 
has over the activity in Eastern Europe. I use the German firm’s control stake in its Eastern European 
affiliate to distinguish between outsourcing and offshoring. I define as an outsourcing activity when 
the German parent firm’s ownership share in the subsidiary in Eastern Europe is less than 30 percent 
and as an offshoring activity when it is more than 30 percent. With the parent’s controlling stake of 
less than 30 percent, the relationship between the parent and affiliate firm resembles more an arms 
length transaction than a transaction inside the firm.9  German outsourcing to Eastern Europe relative 
to offshoring is more likely, the more capital intensive and the less R&D intensive the German firm, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 See Marin and Verdier (2003,2005) for the reasoning.  
8 These results are consistent with the fact that Austria is human capital poor relative to Eastern Europe and thus 
offshores the skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe, see Marin (2004), for its effect on the skill 
premium in Austria, see Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2005). 
9 I follow this procedure, since I do not have separate data on outsourcing. My data include offshoring invest-
ments with an ownership share of the parent company between 10 percent and 100 percent (fully owned subsidi-
 10
and the larger are transport costs. These results are consistent with the estimates on intra-firm imports 
in Table 3. Moreover, outsourcing relative to offshoring is more likely when the host country has a 
low level of corruption,  and when the hold-up problem is mild and the input supplier in Eastern 
Europe can choose between several alternative investors from old Europe. Both tend to lower the costs 
of organizing an activity outside the firm. Finally, larger firms (as measured by the number of work-
ers) with larger organizational costs tend to favor outsourcing, while the most productive firms (rela-
tive to the industry average) tend to favor offshoring over outsourcing.       
              
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ary). Typically, national banks define an offshoring investment, when the parent firm owns at least 10 or 20 
percent of the affiliate’s assets.     
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
log ( K / L )P -0.487 5.407*** -0.276 -0.128 -0.705*** -0.760*** -2.334*** -0.700***
[1.493] [3.008] [0.822] [0.396] [4.269] [4.285] [3.113] [3.932]
log ( R&D / sales )P -1.174*** -1.069 -1.192*** -1.413*** 0.311*** 0.341*** 0.418 0.441*
[4.523] [0.986] [4.177] [4.892] [3.005] [3.305] [0.643] [1.760]
log ( distance ) -0.314 -0.393 -0.455* -0.926*** -1.156*** -1.553*** -0.962***
[1.120] [1.271] [1.663] [3.372] [4.110] [2.683] [2.886]
log ( K / L )A 0.205
[0.493]
log ( R&D / sales )A 1.814*
[2.066]
var ( productivity ) 0.000*** 0.000
[2.864] [0.873]
workers' initiative 0.067 -2.220**
[0.217] [2.186]
log (affiliate wage /  parent wage) -0.345
[1.026]
Aalternative 0.653
[0.583]
property rights -0.642***
[3.058]
tax holidays 4.421***
[2.626]
industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -3.294 -64.390*** 0.964 -0.610 13.160*** 18.749*** 22.495*** -343.168
[0.927] [3.297] [0.187] [0.125] [3.592] [4.656] [4.386] [0.847]
Observations (projects) 192 37 165 191 277 275 77 192
Adjusted R-square 0.34 0.63 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.62 0.45
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.    Determining German and Austrian Intra-Firm Imports from Eastern Europe
property rights: the enforcement of contracts in the country in Eastern Europe as perceived by the investor ranging between 1 (weak contract enforcement) and 5 (effective contract enforcement).
tax holidays: tax holidays granted by a country in Eastern Europe as ranked by the investor. Tax holidays ranges between 1 and 5 with 1 as decisive reason to invest in Eastern Europe for tax holiday 
reasons and 5 not at all important reason for investment.
Dependent variable: log (intermediate imports / parent sales)
Aalternative: Dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no alternative supplier in Eastern Europe for the investor and equal to 0 when there are a few or many alternative suppliers.
GermanyAustria
workers' initiative: mean of 16 parent firm decisions (without R&D) including decision over acquisition and hiring a secretary ranging between 1 and 5  with 1 as central decision at the CEO level and 5 as 
decentral decision at the divisional level.
( K / L )P: parent firm's capital to labor ratio.
( K / L )A: affiliate firm's capital to  labor ratio.
( R&D / sales )P: R&D expenditures in percent of parent firm's sales.
distance: distance in kilometers between parent firm and its affiliates.
( R&D / sales )A: R&D expenditures in percent of affiliate firm's sales.
var ( productivity ): variance of productivity among German and Austrian firms, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log ( K / L )P 0.124 1.035*** -0.043 1.022***
[1.615] [3.704] [0.523] [3.413]
log ( R&D / sales )P -0.095*** -0.040 -0.379*** -0.232** -0.452***
[2.599] [1.009] [3.290] [2.081] [3.545]
log ( R&D / sales )A 0.781**
[2.181]
ln ( distance ) 0.412** 0.750** 0.608*
[2.247] [2.238] [1.897]
var ( productivity ) -0.000*** -0.000**
[3.456] [2.070]
corruption 0.443** 0.390**
[2.363] [1.969]
Palternative -0.913**
[2.214]
log ( L ) 0.194*
[1.838]
Constant -2.962*** -3.859*** -20.019*** -3.949* -21.608***
[3.576] [2.970] [4.032] [1.724] [3.934]
Observations 330 461 205 156 205
Pseudo R-square 0.0591 0.1389 0.4104 0.3062 0.4583
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
L: number of parent firm's employees.
Table 4.    Choosing between Outsourcing and Offshoring among German Firms 
( K / L )P: parent firm's capital to labor ratio.
( R&D / sales )P: R&D expenditures in percent of parent firm's sales.
distance: distance in kilometers between parent firm and its affiliates.
Probit Estimates
var ( productivity ): variance of productivity among German firms.
Dependent variable:  Dummy Outsourcing = 1  Offshoring = 0  
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets, offshoring=0 when ownershipshare > 30%; Outsourcing when ownershipshare ≤ 30%
( R&D / sales )A: R&D expenditure in percent of affiliate firm's sales.
Palternative: Dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no alternative partner for the supplier in Eastern Europe and equal to 0 when there are a few or many alternative partners.
corruption: corruption in the country in Eastern Europe as perceived by the investor ranging between 1 ( pervasive corruption) and 5 (no corruption).
tax holidays: tax holidays granted by a country in Eastern Europe as ranked by the investor. Tax holidays ranges between 1 and 5 with 1 as decisive reason to invest in Eastern 
Europe for tax holiday reasons and 5 not at all important reason for investment.  
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